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Abstract—Several fragile watermarking schemes presented
in the literature are either vulnerable to vector quantization
(VQ) counterfeiting attacks or sacrifice localization accuracy to
improve security. Using a hierarchical structure, we propose a
method that thwarts the VQ attack while sustaining the superior
localization properties of blockwise independent watermarking
methods. In particular, we propose dividing the image into blocks
in a multilevel hierarchy and calculating block signatures in this
hierarchy. While signatures of small blocks on the lowest level of
the hierarchy ensure superior accuracy of tamper localization,
higher level block signatures provide increasing resistance to VQ
attacks. At the top level, a signature calculated using the whole
image completely thwarts the counterfeiting attack. Moreover,
“sliding window” searches through the hierarchy enable the veri-
fication of untampered regions after an image has been cropped.
We provide experimental results to demonstrate the effectiveness
of our method.
Index Terms—Authentication, fragile watermark, tamper local-
ization, vector quantization attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
T
RADITIONALLY, due to the limited processing abilities
in analog media, malicious manipulation of images has
been a tedious task with only low quality results being realized
without prohibitively expensive professional equipment. How-
ever, digital images, unlike their analog counterparts, can be
easily manipulated using a variety of sophisticated image pro-
cessing tools that are readily available as commercial packages.
The ease and extent of such manipulations emphasize the need
for image authentication techniques in applications where veri-
fication of integrity and authenticity of the image content is es-
sential. Potential security loopholes of shared information net-
works,e.g.,Internet,onwhichimagesarecommonlypostedand
distributed further underscore this need.
Multimedia integrity and authenticity can be guaranteed
through the use of digital signatures and/or watermarks. A
digital signature is a data string which associates a message
(in digital form) with some originating entity [1]. Digital
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signatures and their properties have been well studied in cryp-
tography, and a number of algorithms, such as RSA and DSA,
are extensively deployed in various authentication applications
[1]. Digital watermarking (see [2]–[5]) may be utilized in
general to verify authenticity and integrity of multimedia
content. The use of watermarks instead of digital signatures
typically affords additional functionality by exploiting inherent
properties of image content. Examples of such advantages are
the capability for localization of manipulations made to the
image and the direct embedding of the watermark in the image
data. It is worth mentioning that, both digital signatures and
authentication watermarks are useful only for establishing the
source of the image and detecting manipulations occurring
after the signature/watermark has been inserted. However,
neither technique by itself is capable of certifying that an image
represents an original unaltered scene, unless supported by
additional mechanisms [6].
Authentication watermarks can be classified as either fragile
or semi-fragile. Fragile watermarks, as the name implies,
are designed to identify any alteration of the pixel values.
Semi-fragile watermarks, on the other hand, try to differentiate
between content-preserving (nonmalicious) processes, e.g.,
compression, and malicious manipulations, e.g., removal of
objects from a scene. Watermarks in this class are designed
to withstand content-preserving operations, while detecting
any malicious manipulations. Various algorithms have been
proposed for fragile watermarking [7]–[10] and semi-fragile
watermarking [11]–[13]. Though semi-fragile watermarks can
provideextendedfunctionality, inthispaper,we willrestrictour
attention to fragile watermarks for which the issues of tamper
localization and manipulation detection are well defined.
A general block diagram representing most fragile water-
marking schemes is shown in Fig. 1, where the watermark
embedding and extraction processes utilize cryptographic keys.
Fragile watermarks are classified as public key and private key
methods. Private key watermarks are symmetric key systems
which use the same key for watermark embedding and extrac-
tion. The key is known only to the watermark embedder and,
therefore, the verification of the authenticity and integrity of the
image can also be done only by the watermarker alone. Public
key watermarks, on the other hand, are asymmetric key systems
that utilize a secret private key for watermark embedding and a
corresponding publicly available key for the extraction. Public
availability of the extraction key enables public detection of the
watermark and thereby verification of authenticity and integrity
of the image and tamper localization, which is typically desired
in most fragile watermarking applications.
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Fig.1. Fragilewatermarking:(a)embeddingand(b)detection.Authenticityof
the image X is protected by embedding a watermark pattern W. Manipulations
on the watermarked image X is observed through the changes on the detected
watermark.
A well-known algorithm among public key fragile wa-
termarks is Wong’s scheme [8], which embeds a digital
signature of the most significant bits of a block of the image
into the least significant bits of the same block. Despite the
elegance of the algorithm and cryptographic security of the
digital signatures, its blockwise independence was exploited
by Holliman and Memon with a counterfeiting attack [14].
The attacker constructs a vector quantization codebook using
blocks from a set of watermarked images. The image to be
counterfeited is then approximated using this codebook. Since
each block is authenticated by itself, the counterfeit image
appears authentic to the watermarking algorithm. Since the
introduction of VQ codebook attack, a number of modifications
for the existing algorithms have been proposed [9], [14], [15].
Nonetheless, most of these methods, either fail to effectively
address the problem or sacrifice tamper localization accuracy
of the original methods.1
In this paper, we propose a new fragile watermarking algo-
rithm based on the Wong’s scheme [8]. Using a special hier-
archical structure, our method thwarts the VQ codebook at-
tackwhilesustainingthesuperiorlocalizationpropertiesandthe
public key structure of the original algorithm. The image to be
watermarked is divided into blocks in a multilevel hierarchy. At
the lowest level of the hierarchy, the image is partitioned into
a set of elementary blocks composed of groupings of image
pixels. At each successive level, the image is partitioned into
blocks which in turn are composed of blocks at the preceding
level of the hierarchy. At each level of the hierarchy, a digital
signature (or cryptographic hash function) for each block is cal-
culated using the seven most significant bit-plane values of all
pixels within the block. The resulting signature is incorporated
into the LSBs of selected pixels within the block. The selection
of pixels for the embedding of signatures corresponding to a
blockatagivenlevelofthehierarchyisdoneusingapartitionof
theLSBsofeachelementaryblockaccordingtothechosenmul-
tilevel hierarchy. While independent block signatures localize
manipulations at elementary block level, higher level signatures
provide increasing resistance to VQ codebook attacks, grace-
fully trading-off accuracy of localization for greater security.
An alternative approach to the proposed multilevel
(pyramid-like) hierarchical scheme would have been to
embed the watermark in the wavelet transform domain (similar
to the semi-fragile method of Kundur et al. [11]). However,
1During the course of writing this paper, the authors became aware of recent
independent work by Fridrich [16] which provides an alternate elegant solution
to the problem of localization with fragile watermarks in the presence of VQ
attacks.
Fig. 2. Tiling of logo image in Wong’s scheme.
a number of technical and implementation issues make it
impractical to develop a fragile multiresolution watermarking
scheme in the wavelet domain. First, in some cases, random
perturbations of the LSB of the high frequency band coeffi-
cients may result in pixel values that are outside the dynamic
range of the original image, which makes recovery of the
watermark impossible. Moreover, data embedding in the LSB
of the high frequency bands of the wavelet representation may
not correspond to LSB modifications in the image domain, and
the amount of distortion, hence visibility of the watermark,
may increase by the number of stages that are modified in the
wavelet transform.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we discuss Wong’s original scheme, vector quantization
counterfeiting attack, and proposed countermeasures against
this attack. Our hierarchical watermarking method is proposed
in Section III. We present our experimental results and an
analysis of the algorithm in Section IV. Conclusions are drawn
in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Authentication Watermark by Wong
Wong’sscheme[8]isablock-basedwatermarkingtechnique.
In this scheme, given an image , a binary watermark
image of the same size is initialized. In practice, this step is
usuallyachievedbytilingtheoriginalimagewithasmallerlogo
image, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
The original image is partitioned into pixel blocks,
; where denotes such blocks. Likewise, the
watermark image is partitioned into blocks, . For each block
, a corresponding block is formed by setting the least
significant bit of each pixel to zero. A cryptographic hash, e.g.,
MD5 or SHA [1], of transformed block and image dimen-
sions is computed
(1)
The signature of a block is formed by XORing the computed
hash with the watermark pattern and encrypting the result with
a public key encryption algorithm
Encrypt (2)
where denotes the bitwise XOR operator. Finally, the sig-
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block. Note that the application of this procedure independently
on each block produces the watermarked image.
During watermark verification similar steps are followed.
First the candidate image is partitioned into blocks .
Signature is read from the least significant bits of each
block, . s are formed by setting LSBs to zero and s
are calculated using image sizes and s. Finally, watermark
image blocks are recovered by XORing the hash values with
decrypted signatures from each block
Decrypt (3)
Any changes in the pixel values of a block alter either the de-
crypted signature or output of the hash function. Thus, any ma-
nipulation on the image is detected by the change in the corre-
sponding region of the binary watermark image.
B. Vector Quantization Counterfeiting Attack
Holliman and Memon [14] proposed a counterfeiting attack
on blockwise independent watermarking schemes. The attacker
approximates an image for which he wishes to create a forgery
by using a collage of authentic blocks from watermarked
images. Since the embedding and authentication processes are
blockwise,thecollageimageisauthenticatedbytheverification
algorithm. Given a large enough database of watermarked im-
ages, the attacker can ensure that the counterfeit collage image
has the same visual appearance as his original unwatermarked
image.
In order to explain this attack, let us define blockwise inde-
pendence and -equivalence first. Note that, the terminology
and notation adopted here is similar to that utilized in [14]. A
watermarking technique is block-based if it partitions an image
into nonoverlapping blocks and inserts
a watermark in block using the key . A block-based
technique is blockwise independent if each watermarked block
depends only on the original block , the watermark
and the insertion key .
Thus, watermark embedding function and the detection
function , which operates on an potentially altered image
, can be represented by
(4)
(5)
where are embedding keys which may be de-
rived from a single key , is the wa-
termark pattern and denotes concatenation.
Furthermore, two image blocks and are said to be -
equivalent if a given key extracts the same watermark from
both of them. That is
(6)
Hence, given a key , any blockwise independent water-
marking method partitions the set of all image blocks into
equivalence classes , where is the
number of different possible watermark signals. The appli-
cation of a watermark detection process to any block from a
given equivalence class results in the same watermark being
recovered with the key .
The attack exploits the K-equivalence property of blockwise
independentwatermarkingschemes.Supposetheattackerwants
to counterfeit an image , and has access to one or more im-
ages, say , watermarked by a watermark image and a key
. The attacker can construct a counterfeit image which is
sufficiently similar to as follows:
Let and
be a watermarked image of
the same size.
for to
Identify equivalence class of .
Find an approximation to such
that .
Replace by .
Construct .
Inmostcases,onlypartialknowledgeofthewatermarkimage
,e.g.,thetilingoflogoimagesinWong’sscheme,issufficient
to classify the blocks of the watermarked images into the dif-
ferent equivalence classes . Thus the watermarked images
canbeusedtopopulatesubsetsoftheequivalenceclasses,which
can then be used in the approximation process described above.
Thesesubsetsmaybeviewedasvector-quantization(VQ)code-
books,withthecodebookcorrespondingtoanequivalenceclass
composed of the blocks from the watermarked images
that are in . The process of approximating by such that
and can be interpreted as vector quantization
of using the codebook corresponding to .
VQ attack on Wong’s scheme is performed similarly. Parti-
tioning of the binary watermark image composed of tiles effec-
tively partitions the logo image into blocks (Fig. 2). Thus, each
distinct block of the logo represents an equivalence class in the
attack. A vector quantization codebook is constructed for each
such class by properly assigning blocks of the watermarked im-
ages to an equivalence class. Resulting codebooks can be used
to carry out steps of the attack, which are explained above. An
example demonstrating the success of such an attack is seen in
Fig. 15.
C. Countermeasures Against Counterfeiting Attack on Wong’s
Scheme
In this section, we will elaborate on a number of modifica-
tions on Wong’s scheme which have been proposed as counter-
measures against the vector quantization counterfeiting attack.
• Increasing Block Dimensions
Expected distortion and therefore the visual quality
degradation caused by a vector quantization process
depends on two key factors: the size and the number of
image blocks in a codebook. Smaller size blocks can be588 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON IMAGE PROCESSING, VOL. 11, NO. 6, JUNE 2002
approximated more accurately given a fixed size code-
book. Similarly, better approximations can be obtained
as the number of blocks in the codebook increases.
Therefore, the possibility of a reasonable forgery can be
reduced by increasing the block dimensions used in the
watermarking process. Larger blocks also decrease the
number of authentic blocks that can be obtained from
one fixed-size image, further degrading the quality of the
forgery by reducing codebook sizes.
This countermeasure, however, does not thwart the at-
tack completely; if the set of watermarked images avail-
able to the attacker is quite large, reasonable forgeries
can still be produced. Moreover, using larger and larger
blocksalsoimpairsthetamperlocalizationaccuracyofthe
watermark.
• Including Block Indices in the Signature
Wong’s scheme may be slightly modified to include
image indices in the signature computation step
(7)
Encrypt (8)
This effectively increases the number of equivalence
classes. Now, blocks from different locations belong to
separate equivalence classes. The codebook for each
class is limited to the blocks with the same index, yet it is
possible to launch an attack given a large enough database
of watermarked images.
• Including Image Indices in the Signature
In [15], Wong and Memon suggest including also a
uniqueimageindexinthesignature.Thisfurtherincreases
the number of equivalence classes and restricts the code-
book construction domain. Using sufficiently large index
values, counterfeiting attack can be practically eliminated
(9)
Encrypt (10)
However, it should be noted that such an index would also
benecessaryduringverification.Whilemanagingsuchin-
dividual indices for all images in a database may be pos-
sible for some applications, in most of the practical appli-
cations this constitutes an enormous burden. Considering
such limitations, Wong and Memon suggests the extrac-
tion of the index from the image itself, e.g., as a hash of
the whole image. Despite being a feasible alternative to
index storage and management, this completely impairs
the localization ability of the watermark. Manipulation in
a single pixel of the image alters the calculated image
index, which in turn results in different hash values
for all blocks. Effectively, smallest change in the image
distorts all of the extracted watermark.
An alternative approach to overcome the challenge of
image index storage has been proposed by Fridrich et al.
[9]. In their method, an image index is embedded within
the image in multiple positions. In case of a manipulation,
Fig. 3. Breaking blockwise independence. A larger support X (shaded area)
is used to calculate the signature which is embedded in X (dark grey region).
the multiple copies increase the chances of extracting the
correct image index during watermark detection. Never-
theless, this does not guarantee correct index extraction in
all cases. A manipulation that is spatially restricted within
regions carrying the index values may lead to extraction
ofcorrupt indexvalues.Sincethesevaluesare usedduring
verification of all imageregions, such a manipulation may
cause the entire image to be invalidated even though the
manipulationalteredonlyasmallpartoftheimageandthe
major portion of the image is unaltered from the authentic
version. The embedding of multiple copies also either in-
creases the embedding distortion or reduces the localiza-
tion ability of the watermark by consuming capacity that
is normally utilized by the digital signatures.
• Breaking Block-Wise Independence: Neighborhood De-
pendent Blocks
Increasing the number of equivalence classes requires
larger databases of watermarked images for the construc-
tionofgoodVQcodebooks,therebymakingtheVQcoun-
terfeiting attack impractical in most cases. An alternative
method of eliminating the VQ counterfeiting attack is to
eliminate the blockwise independence of the watermark.
In particular, the signature embedded in a block may
be calculated using a larger support , which overlaps
the neighboring blocks (Fig. 3). This technique is very
similar to block chaining modes used in block encryp-
tion techniques, e.g., CBC mode in DES [1]. Using this
scheme, a collage of individually watermarked blocks of
an image is no longer authenticated by the watermarking
extraction process because the larger support covering the
neighboring blocks is not preserved.
Though the use of neighborhood dependent blocks
eliminates the possibility of a forgery going undetected,
the method results in some ambiguity in tamper localiza-
tion. For instance, Fig. 4 shows a possible result of the
detection process using the proposed modification. Only
shaded areas in the center are detected as nonauthentic,
which may have resulted from two different manipula-
tions:
— Center blocks of the image has been altered
— Parts of two different images are collated together.
Therefore, in this case, it is not possible to indicate the
extent of the manipulation.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
We propose a hierarchical modification of Wong’s scheme,
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Fig. 4. Tamper localization in neighborhood dependent watermark. Unshaded
areas are authenticated.
Fig. 5. Partitioning of an image and the resulting four level hierarchical block
structure.
tamper localization. In particular, we propose calculating sig-
natures of the image blocks in a hierarchy. We first describe the
proposed hierarchical watermarking scheme. The watermark
insertion and extraction processes and cropping detection are
presented thereafter.
A. Hierarchical Block-Based Watermarking
A hierarchical block-based watermarking technique inserts
and extracts a watermark in a multilevel hierarchy. Parti-
tioning of the image into nonoverlapping blocks constitutes
the lowest level of the hierarchy (Fig. 5). Successive levels
of the hierarchy are formed by combining distinct groups of
blocks at a preceding level of the hierarchy. In general, the
number of blocks from a lower level of the hierarchy that are
combined to form a block at the next level of the hierarchy
may be arbitrarily chosen, however, in order to keep the no-
tation and the description simpler, we assume for the rest of
this paper that the region of 2 2 blocks at a given level of
the hierarchy are combined to create a block at the next level
of the hierarchy.
Given an image , we first form a multilevel hier-
archical block structure. Let us denote a block in this hierarchy
by , where the indices represent the spatial position of
the block and is the level of the hierarchy to which the block
belongs. The total number of levels in the hierarchy is further
denoted by .
On the lowest level, we partition the image into
nonoverlapping blocks . At each
successive level, the image is partitioned into blocks which in
turn are composed of 2 2 blocks at the preceding level of the
hierarchy. That is,
for to
Finally, top level of the hierarchy consists of only one block
. Note that we have larger blocks, in particular
, at upper levels of the hierarchy; no filtering
or decimation is performed.
B. Watermark Insertion
The watermark insertion procedure consists of three main
blocks as seen in Fig. 6: i) Formation of block hierarchy as
described above, ii) Computation of block signatures, and
iii) Watermark insertion.
Upon formation of a proper hierarchy, for each block ,a
corresponding block is formed by setting the least signifi-
cant bit of each pixel to zero. Corresponding digital signatures
are computed evaluating each pixel of the block as a bit
string. Only exception to the procedure is the top level block,
where a topindicator is also includedafterthe block.In general,
this step consists of the calculation of hash of the block and
public key encryption of the result
for to
top (11)
Encrypt (12)
where “top” is included only when .
Resulting signatures for each block are inserted into
least significant bit-plane of the image. Since the blocks on
different levels of the hierarchy share the same LSB plane,
a partitioning algorithm that prevents any collision during
insertion is required. A simple strategy is spreading high level
signatures over a number of lower level blocks and inserting
the accumulated payload at the lowest level of the hierarchy
by LSB modification. Each lowest level block then carries a
portion of upper level signatures, together with its independent
signature. For instance, in a hierarchy of three levels and a
digital signature of bits, lowest level block carries
bits which consists of , , bits corresponding to
the entire signature of itself, one fourth of the upper level
block’s and one sixteenth of the top level block’s, respectively.
Thus, we proceed with partitioning the signature of each block
into a number of smaller strings, where the exact number of590 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON IMAGE PROCESSING, VOL. 11, NO. 6, JUNE 2002
Fig. 6. Watermark insertion process for the proposed method.
Fig. 7. Concatenation of signature blocks to form a payload (left) and spatial placement of resulting payload in LSB-plane of the image.
such partitions is determined by the level of the block in the
hierarchy
(13)
where . The number of lowest level blocks on
which the signature is spread is then . Once atomic units
are prepared, payload of a block on the lowest level is formed
by concatenating these units inherited from higher level blocks
(14)
(15)
This particular partitioning structure keeps the signature of
the block at each level localized inside the corresponding block.
As a result, pixel manipulations outside a block do not effect
the recovery of the signature and therefore the verification of
the particular block.
Finally, LSB-plane of each block on the lowest level of the
hierarchy is replaced by payload bits. Let denote modified
blocks. The watermarked image is a simple concatenation of
these blocks. An illustration of the process is seen in Fig. 7
(16)
Fig. 8. Watermark verification process for the proposed method.
C. Watermark Verification
The watermark verification process consists of three basic
stepsanalogoustotheinsertionprocedure:i)Formationofblock
hierarchy,ii)Extractionofblocksignatures,andiii)Verification
block signatures (Fig. 8).
Hierarchical block structure is formed as explained in Sec-
tion III-A. Payloads are extracted from the LSB-plane of
each block at the lowest level. The partitioning algorithm used
during insertion is reversed to recover all block signatures .
For each block , a quantized version is obtained by
setting least significant bits of the pixels to zero. The reader will
notice that remains intact during watermark insertion; thus,
unlessthewatermarked imageis subsequentlymanipulated
will be identical to .
At the last step, we verify the signature . A block
is deemed authentic if the signature verifies the quantized
block . A number of verification methods enabled by publicCELIK et al.: HIERARCHICAL WATERMARKING FOR SECURE IMAGE AUTHENTICATION 591
Fig. 9. Crop detection process. (a) A section of the watermarked image is
cropped, seen in bold boundaries. Lowest level search is performed in the
shaded area. Once the block boundary is synchronized at the lowest level,
higher level searches are done in 2 ￿ 2 neighborhoods. (b) Corresponding
watermark detection output. Shaded regions are not verified at any level.
Complete blocks are verified at various levels of the hierarchy. Numbers show
the lowest level of verification.
key digital signature schemes may be utilized in this process. A
general method consists of the following steps:
Decrypt (17)
Veri￿ed
True if
False otherwise.
(18)
As a result of the signature verification step, a hierarchical
authenticity structure, an instance of which is seen in Fig. 12, is
constructed. At the lowest level of the hierarchy, the proposed
method reduces to the original Wong’s scheme with high
tamper localization accuracy and susceptibility to a vector
quantization counterfeiting attack. At each successive level,
larger blocks yield lower resolution authentication maps with
increasing resilience against counterfeiting attacks. The top
level signature does not enable any tamper localization, how-
ever it completely thwarts the possibility of a counterfeiting
attack. A secure image authentication scheme with good local-
ization properties is achieved when the results of the signature
verification step are evaluated altogether.
D. Cropping Detection
Croppingisoneofthesimplestimagemanipulationsthatmay
be performed, wherein a smaller rectangular region of a larger
image is extracted and the remaining portions discarded. Given
an arbitrarily cropped image, it is desirable that a fragile water-
marking scheme indicates the presence of cropping while still
authenticating unaltered regions of the image. The detection of
cropping has however received only limited attention in fragile
watermarking so far. In most cases, the watermark detection al-
gorithm will fail to verify even the authentic regions due to the
loss of synchronization of block boundaries. For blockwise in-
dependent watermarking schemes, a “sliding-window” search
can be utilized to regain synchronization with the block-bound-
aries as illustrated in Fig. 9. For the hierarchical scheme pre-
sented in this paper, a hierarchical search can be used to regain
synchronization, detect the presence of cropping, and also au-
thenticate untampered cropped regions. On the lowest level, a
sliding window search is performed in an block. Once
Fig. 10. Original watermarked image.
lowest level synchronization is regained, higher level searches
are performed only using “sliding-block window” searches in
2 2 block neighborhoods.
Ashortcomingoftheproposedschemecanbeobservedwhen
only a quarter of the image has been cropped. In this case, all
theblocksignaturesmatchestheoriginal signaturesatalllevels.
However, the slight modification of the signature formation for
the top level (a “top” indicator is included) eliminates the possi-
bilityofcroppinggoingundetected.Theproposedmethodprop-
erly differentiates a part of the original image from the whole
image.
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We proposed a novel hierarchical authentication watermark
in the preceding section. Now, we will demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of our method with experimental results and discuss
the performance of the algorithm.
A. Experimental Results
Weimplementedaprivateandapublickeyversionofthepro-
posed algorithm, differentiated by the digital signature scheme
used.Fortheprivatekeyversion,weusea64bitMAC(message
authentication code) based on MD5 algorithm as a digital sig-
nature, and for the public key version the 320 bit DSA (digital
signature algorithm) is employed. Details of the cryptographic
functions mentioned here may be found in common cryptog-
raphy texts such as [1].
In the first test case, we demonstrate the localization and
tamper detection ability of our algorithm. An image is water-
marked by the private key version of the algorithm yielding
the watermarked image seen in Fig. 10. During embedding,
the 832 512 gray-scale image has been decomposed into a
seven-level hierarchy with 13 8 blocks at the lowest level.
Note that LSBs of a lowest level block may be modified to
carry a payload of 13 8 104 bits, which is sufficient to
accommodate the 4/3 64 86 bits required by the algorithm.
At each successive level, block dimensions are doubled, until
the top level consists of the whole image. Watermarked image
is then manipulated using image processing software to yield
the image seen in Fig. 11. In particular, the license plate of the
car and the number on the door in the background are altered.
Magnified versions of the manipulated regions are presented in592 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON IMAGE PROCESSING, VOL. 11, NO. 6, JUNE 2002
Fig. 11. Manipulated image. License plate of the car and the number on the
door in the background are altered.
Fig.12. Watermarkdetectionoutput.Numbersandshadingindicatethelowest
level signature verified. Darkest regions are not verified at any level.
Fig. 13. License plate of the car and number on the door: Original (top),
Manipulated (center), Detection output (bottom).
Fig. 13 (top and center). In the third step, integrity and authen-
ticity of the manipulated image is tested using the watermark
detection algorithm. Output of the watermark detection step is
seen in Figs. 12 and 13 (bottom). Numbers and shading indicate
thelowestlevelsignatureverified,wheredarkestregionsarenot
verified at any level. In Fig. 12, darkest regions obtained using
thelowestlevelofthehierarchycontainthetamperinginasmall
Fig. 14. Original unwatermarked fingerprint image.
Fig. 15. Counterfeit image (Wong scheme). Vector quantization attack uses
8 ￿ 8 blocks from 19 watermarked images.
region. Higher level signature results confirm the response from
the lowest level.
Effectiveness of the proposed algorithm against a VQ attack
has been demonstrated in the second test case. As in [14], a
database of fingerprint images has been used for this attack.
The images of size 640 640 are first watermarked by Wong’s
original scheme and our hierarchical method, separately, using
the minimum block sizes possible. The example illustrated here
utilizes a private key implementation with a 64 bit MAC for
whichtheminimumblocksizesforWong’sschemeandthepro-
posed scheme are 8 8 and 10 10, respectively. The slightly
larger block size in the latter case arises because the LSB pay-
load consists of not only the block signature but also the accu-
mulated signatures from various levels of the hierarchy. While
the original unwatermarked image is seen in Fig. 14, counter-
feit images for Wong’s original scheme and our hierarchical
methodarepresentedinFigs.15and16.Inbothcases,19water-
marked images are utilized for constructing vector quantization
codebooks. Note that the VQ codebooks consist of 8 8 and
10 10 blocks corresponding to the minimum block sizes used
by the watermarking algorithms. As a result of a successful at-
tack, Fig. 15 is verified as authentic by Wong’s scheme. Output
of our hierarchical method indicates that the attack is indeed
successful at the lowest level of the hierarchy. Signatures of allCELIK et al.: HIERARCHICAL WATERMARKING FOR SECURE IMAGE AUTHENTICATION 593
Fig. 16. Counterfeit image (Proposed hierarchical method). Vector
quantization attack uses 10 ￿ 10 blocks from 19 watermarked images.
blocks at this level are verified by our algorithm. Yet, on the
higher levels of the hierarchy, block signatures cannot be veri-
fied. Evaluating the results as a whole we may confidently tell
that counterfeiting attack is thwarted by the algorithm.
In this example, we assumed that the attacker uses the lowest
level blocks, yet given sufficient resources larger level blocks
may be used in the process. Even in that case, the attack will
be detected on the next higher level, unless top level block, the
imageitself,isn’tverifiedasawholeusingthesignature.Infact,
the hierarchical method provides complete resilience against
vector quantization counterfeiting attacks.
B. Localization Accuracy
In Wong’s scheme, tamper detection is done on a block basis.
Thus, tamper localization ability of the scheme is bounded by
the block size used. On the other hand, as the signature of each
block is inserted into the least significant bit-plane of the block,
minimumblocksizeisdeterminedbythelengthofthesignature
used
(19)
where is the length of the signature, and is the tamper lo-
calization ability of the algorithm in pixels.
Similarly,localizationabilityofourmethodisboundedbythe
size of the blocks on the lowest level of the hierarchy. Nonethe-
less, the relation between the signature size and localization
ability is not immediately obvious, since the LSB-plane of
each block at the lowest level carries a larger payload then its
signature. In a hierarchy of levels, payload of such a block,
and the localization ability thereof, can be calculated as
(20)
In particular, our algorithm slightly compromises localization
ability in comparison with the original scheme, in order to gain
increased robustness against VQ attacks. Despite the loss rel-
ative to Wong’s scheme, fine granular localization (down to
10 10 blocks) can be achieved in practice.
C. Security Under Brute Force Attacks
Security of an algorithm may only be evaluated against
known attacks. Two particular points of concern in fragile
watermarking algorithms are forgery with brute-force attack
and forgery with vector quantization attack. In the previous
section we have demonstrated the effectiveness of our system
against vector quantization counterfeiting.
In this section, we will compare the strength of our method
with original scheme under brute-force attacks on digital sig-
natures. As none of the methods specify a particular signature
algorithm, we will assume that a signature of length requires
trials for a successful forgery, and same length signatures
are used for both of the methods. We further assume that min-
imum possible block sizes are used to partition an image of size
in both cases.
Number of signatures embedded in each case equals to the
total number of blocks. In the original scheme the image is tiled
using blocks of size ; thus the number of blocks and thereof
signatures is:
(21)
On the other hand, in the hierarchical scheme blocks of size
(ref. Section IV-B) tile the image. After higher level
block signatures are included, total number of signatures will
be:
(22)
That is, perfect forgery of an image using a brute-force attack
will require roughly equal number of signature forgeries
[ trials] in each case.
D. Computational Complexity
A discretionary categorization of operations involved in the
proposed approach will yield two classes; namely, digital signa-
ture computation(/verification) operations, and memory manip-
ulations which prepare image data for these operations. Since
the computational complexity of the latter group is negligible
withrespecttothefirst,fromnowonwewillrefertothenumber
of digital signature operations required as the computational
complexity of the algorithm.
Given the above definition, let us analyze the complexity of
the original scheme and the proposed approach. First, we will
consider both schemes without the cropping detection function-
ality outlined in Section III-D.
The number of digital signatures present in each scheme is
derived in Section IV-B, in the context of brute force attacks.
As a result, it is established that both schemes require approx-
imately the same number of digital signatures i.e., ( ), and
therefore ( ) signature operations. The computational com-
plexities of these schemes are thus approximately equal.
Now, let us consider the complexity of an hierarchical
“sliding window” search explained in Section III-D. Without
loss of generality, we assume that during embedding the image
has been organized in an level hierarchy with blocks
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search in a neighborhood is sufficient to regain syn-
chronization, i.e., at least one block is guaranteed to start in
this neighborhood. Since block boundaries of different levels
are aligned, once the synchronization is regained at some level,
the search at any subsequent (higher) level need only consider
possible groupings of the blocks obtained at the preceding
(lower) level of the hierarchy, which is only a very small subset
of all possible positionings. In particular, the “sliding window”
of a higher level consists of a 2 2 neighborhood of lower level
blocks. Therefore, in the worst case, regaining synchronization
after an arbitrary cropping requires
(23)
digital signature operations. Moreover, the average computa-
tional burden will be half of the complexity for the worst case
scenario, if the cropping position is assumed to be uniformly
distributed. Note that the corresponding search complexity in
Wong’s original scheme is rather small, because a single level
search is sufficient, and furthermore for the same digital signa-
ture algorithm, Wong’s scheme allows for smaller block-sizes
than the scheme proposed here (Section IV-B).
In order to quantify values of the worst case search com-
plexity encountered in practice, let us consider the fingerprint
databaseexampleofSectionIV-A,whereoriginalandproposed
schemes operate on 8 8 and 10 10 blocks, respectively. In
the latter case, the hierarchy is composed of seven levels. In this
example,theproposedschemerequires120digitalsignatureop-
erations for cropping detection. Wong’s original scheme, on the
other hand, requires 64 signature operations, which is roughly
half of what is required by the proposed scheme. Nonetheless,
in either case the increase in overall complexity due to crop-
ping detection is rather insignificant, 1% and 2%, respectively.
Therefore, in typical images, the computational complexities of
the two schemes with cropping detection are comparable.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we describe a new hierarchical fragile water-
marking scheme based on the public key watermark by Wong
[8]. The proposed method eliminates the vulnerabilities of the
original scheme to VQ counterfeiting attack of Holliman and
Memon [14]. As the attack effort is stepped up by using larger
image blocks and larger image databases for the generation of
counterfeitimages,thehierarchicalschemegracefullysacrifices
tamper localization accuracy while still detecting forgeries.
The hierarchical scheme offers a significant advantage over
most other watermarking schemes in that it allows for detection
of cropping while still authenticating untampered cropped re-
gions, albeit at a lower level of confidence.
In this paper, the hierarchical watermarking scheme was de-
scribed as applied to Wong’s scheme. The method can, how-
ever, be readily applied to other block-wise independent fragile
watermarking algorithms in order to thwart vector quantization
counterfeiting attacks.
VQ based attacks on blockwise independent watermarking
schemes hint at the existence of a trade-off between the accu-
racyoflocalizationandthesecurity/robustness(forsemi-fragile
schemes) of watermarking methods aimed at tamper localiza-
tion. This seems analogous to the inherent trade-off between
embedding distortion and capacity encountered with robust wa-
termarking [17] and is worth investigating further.
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